The July 11 bombings in Uganda carried out by the al Qaeda-linked group al Shabaab exposed the global terror threat emerging in the Horn of Africa – a region also plagued by destitution and authoritarian rule. This week, however, about 3.5 million people in the region will celebrate a remarkable victory for democracy. The government of a Muslim population just north of the territory controlled by al Shabaab will experience a peaceful transfer of power between opposing political parties one month after a free and fair presidential election. The government conducted the multi-party election by its own initiative and with limited external assistance or pressure. The feat, which has so far received little attention in the West, reaffirms the idea that democracy can take root in cultures of any religious and socio-economic background, and it occurs at a time when U.S. foreign policy has shied away from promoting democratic allies in strategic parts of the world. This democratic success story takes place in Somaliland, which borders a country to the south that is overwhelmingly controlled by terrorists (Somalia), sits 150 miles across the Gulf of Aden from one of al Qaeda’s stronger safe-havens (Yemen), is roughly 70 miles south of one of the world’s leading state sponsors of terror (Eritrea), and is separated by only one country from the site of a recent genocide (Sudan).
Somaliland’s nascent democracy features a bicameral parliament and an independent executive branch, as stipulated by a constitution that its people approved through a national referendum in May 2001. A mere 80 votes separated the victor from the runner-up in Somaliland’s 2003 presidential election, yet the miniscule margin of victory – rare in a region where incumbents generally expect to win 99 percent of the vote (as happened in Ethiopia’s May parliamentary elections) – generated no internal violence.
This year’s presidential election witnessed an opposition candidate defeat the incumbent by 16 percentage points. Somaliland’s independent National Electoral Commission, a seven-member body that must include at least two members nominated by the opposition parties, has asked the public to support the new leadership, and the outgoing president accepted defeat without a challenge. Somaliland’s citizens have refrained from engaging in any form of political violence in the month since the election (compare that to the 1,500 people killed in Kenya following elections in 2007).
Hundreds of thousands of Somaliland’s 1.06 million registered voters (men and women age 16 and older) rejected threats of terror and defied radical Islamist ideology to cast their votes. The leader of al Shabaab described democratic elections as “the devil’s principles” and called on the people of Somaliland to oppose the election in an audio-recording released just two days prior to the vote. An internal U.N. report warned of the risk of suicide bombers targeting the election, and Somaliland’s security and intelligence forces arrested several suspected terrorists in the weeks leading up to the poll. The terrorists were kept at bay, however, allowing Somalilanders to express their will in a vote that the International Republican Institute’s robust team of observers deemed “peaceful, without major incident, and generally [in accordance with] international standards.”
The people of Somaliland, whose flag displays the same Islamic shahaada (i.e. “There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is the Prophet of Allah”) as the flag of Saudi Arabia, demonstrated that democracy can be welcomed and embraced by Muslim populations and in regions historically beset by terror, violence, poverty, and corruption. The example Somalilanders set by their own volition should serve as an inspiration to oppressed populations around the world and be applauded by the United States.
The U.S. government issued a cautious and inconspicuous response to the improbable story of Somaliland’s successful election shortly after official results were announced. The U.S. embassy in Kenya released a statement only to local media outlets congratulating Somaliland on its election proceedings, but it never made the statement publically available on its website. The State Department spokespeople in Washington, who have issued statements this year praising successful elections in Ukraine and Chile, have remained completely silent on the issue, as has the White House.
Perhaps this meager response should come as no surprise: not a single government in the world has officially recognized Somaliland since it declared its independence from Somalia in 1991 following the collapse of the oppressive Siad Barre regime. The contrast between Somalia and Somaliland, however, could not be more conspicuous. Somalia has gone from a failed state to a land overrun with international terrorists who have imposed a draconian form of Islamic law on the Somali people. Somaliland, on the other hand, has now held four national elections, maintained relative peace and stability, boasts a security force that has denied terrorists a safe-haven, and operates a minimally-resourced coast guard that still manages to arrest dozens of pirates off its shores.
Recognizing a self-declared state is an extremely complicated process that must consider a multitude of factors, including the effect it would have on regional actors (both allies and adversaries), the precedent it would set for recognizing other self-declared states, and the impact it would have on existing treaties and agreements. A successful election and peaceful transfer of power cannot and should not automatically result in America’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state, but the United States should at least begin to evaluate the merits of having a democratic ally in such a strategically important region of the world. Moreover, the U.S. cannot afford to miss yet another opportunity to support a Muslim population that has rejected terror and authoritarian rule in favor of democracy. Praising the democratic developments in Somaliland would inspire and motivate democracy advocates and dissidents in Iran, Egypt, Sudan, and other oppressed Muslim populations.
Somaliland’s election and peaceful transfer of power illuminates a beacon of hope in a part of the world that poses a growing and legitimate security threat to the United States and allies such as Uganda. Democratic partners that work to uphold the rule of law and stand up to terrorists are a rarity in the greater Middle East and Africa. The time has come for the United States to start examining whether or not Somaliland may be a partner worth recognizing and embracing.
Chris Harnisch is an analyst and the Gulf of Aden team leader for the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute. He has briefed members of Congress and the Senate on Yemen and Somalia, and he has published articles on the Islamist threat in those countries in numerous publications. Prior to joining AEI, Chris served on the staff of Vice President Dick Cheney. Chris has lived and studied in Yemen and Egypt.
Tuesday, July 27, 2010
Monday, July 26, 2010
Sunday, July 25, 2010
In Somalia, Talk to the Enemy
Op-Ed Contributor
In Somalia, Talk to the Enemy
By BRONWYN BRUTON
Published: July 24, 2010
Edel Rodriguez
Related
Times Topic: Al Shabab
-
Tea With a Terrorist (July 25, 2010)
And so, the Ethiopian military moved into Somalia to protect the unpopular government, and for the next two years the United States bankrolled a brutal occupation. Today, no one doubts that this was a tragic error. To defend the dysfunctional government, Ethiopian soldiers robbed, killed and raped with abandon. The perception that the United States had sided with Ethiopia and the African Union internationalized the conflict. Ultimately it allowed Al Qaeda to gain a foothold in a country that American intelligence, in 2007, had declared to be “inoculated” against all kinds of foreign extremist movements.
Sadly, today, the Obama administration is poised to repeat its predecessor’s mistake.
The situation now is very similar to what it was in 2006. The Ethiopian soldiers are gone, but the regime they protected, the so-called Transitional Federal Government, is still in place, now protected by 6,000 African Union peacekeeping troops. Like the Ethiopians before them, African Union soldiers from Uganda and Burundi are inflicting thousands of civilian casualties, indiscriminately shelling neighborhoods in Mogadishu. Today most of southern Somalia is under the control of a vicious mob of teenage radicals known as Al Shabab, who are clearly getting guidance from Al Qaeda and who have proudly claimed responsibility for the attack earlier this month that killed 76 people in Uganda.
Nobody, from the White House to the African Union, can believe that the ineffectual transitional government has any hope of governing Somalia. During the latest round of infighting the speaker of Parliament was ousted and the prime minister was fired (though he has refused to step down), and soon afterward the minister of defense resigned, accusing the government not only of incompetence but also of trying to assassinate him.
Yet in the past 18 months, the international community has trained some 10,000 Somali soldiers to support this government, and American taxpayers have armed them. Seven or eight thousand of these troops have already deserted, taking their new guns with them. Indeed, Somalia’s Western-backed army is a significant source of Al Shabab’s weapons and ammunition, according to the United Nations Monitoring Group.
There are better ways for the United States to prevent the rise of terrorist groups in Somalia. A strategy of “constructive disengagement” — in which the international community would extricate itself from Somali politics, but continue to provide development and humanitarian aid and conduct the occasional special forces raid against the terrorists — would probably be enough to pull the rug out from under Al Shabab. This group, led mostly by foreign extremists fresh from the battlefields of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, is internally divided, and is hated in Somalia.
It has recruited thousands of Somali children into its militias and uses them to brutally impose a foreign ideology on the religiously moderate Somali people. The “child judges,” as they are known, are responsible for many of Al Shabab’s worst human rights violations, including stoning and amputation.
The only way Al Shabab can flourish, or even survive in the long term, is to hold itself up as an alternative to the transitional government and the peacekeepers. If the Somali public did not have to face this grim choice, the thousands of clan and business militiamen would eventually put up a fight against Al Shabab’s repressive religious edicts and taxes. (Somalia’s sheer ungovernability is both its curse and its blessing.) And without a battle against peacekeepers to unite it, Al Shabab would likely splinter into nationalist and transnational factions.
Why has the Obama administration allowed this violent farce to continue? In a nutshell, it has fallen into the same trap as the Bush administration: Distracted by the unwarranted concern that withdrawing the soldiers would allow Al Qaeda to take control of Somalia, the administration argues that it can’t afford to step back.
On the contrary, it can’t afford to do anything else. To truly stabilize Somalia by force would require 100,000 troops. Putting another few thousand on the ground — as the African Union has announced it will do — would only increase the violence. It could also necessitate sending soldiers from Ethiopia or other bordering states, bolstering Al Shabab’s best argument for popular support.
Because plans to send more soldiers to Somalia cannot succeed without American support, the Obama administration is at a significant crossroads. It is essential that it resist the temptation to allow history to repeat itself.
Instead, the United States should negotiate with the moderate elements within Al Shabab. It is not a monolithic movement, after all. Extremists from Kenya, Afghanistan, Somaliland and elsewhere have spoken publicly for the group. But Al Shabab also includes many of the same Somali religious leaders who controlled the Union of Islamic Courts in 2006, the people the Bush administration once hoped to draw into the transitional government. Some of these leaders are extremists, and the idea of talking with them is unappetizing. But the United States can and should negotiate with them directly.
Such an effort would be supported by most Somalis, who are desperate to be rid of the foreign extremists. And it is the best alternative to escalating the violence and strengthening Al Shabab.
Thursday, July 22, 2010
Dutch deportation of Somalis "a death sentence"
Dutch deportation of Somalis "a death sentence"
Published on : 22 July 2010 - 7:08pm | By Marijke Peters (Photo: Flickr/Carl Montgomery)The Somalis could be put on a plane within the next 24 hours, despite UN guidelines advising against deportations to south-central Somalia. The country has been without a functioning government since 1991 and the militant al-Qaeda-inspired Shebab group regularly carries out fatal attacks. In March, the Mayor of Mogadishu urged the city’s residents to flee, and the UN estimates 44,000 left between April and June.
Listen to an interview with Leslie Lefkow of Human Rights Watch
Stream of complaints
Human Rights Watch is the latest organisation to criticise the Dutch Justice Ministry over the removal plans – earlier this month the Dutch Refugee Network said the move was “irresponsible”.
HRW’s Senior West Africa researcher Leslie Lefkow said: “The reality is that the Somali transitional government controls very little territory. They actually control only a few blocks of Mogadishu, so they’re not in a position to guarantee any kind of security or protection for people being returned to Mogadishu.”
The Dutch government says most Somali asylum applicants in the Netherlands have their requests approved, but claims the eight didn’t meet the requirements for state protection. A Justice Ministry spokeswoman told RNW:
“It’s not that the Minister of Justice thinks it’s a good situation in Somalia. He acknowledges it’s very difficult and worrying over there. That’s why most of the Somalian refugees get asylum in the Netherlands, but not all of them. After research, sometimes we find that they don’t need protection in some cases. If we don’t give someone asylum, someone has the responsibility of returning to their home country.”
Under constant fire
HRW says the eight face threats of violence from insurgents in Mogadishu and would also be affected by daily shelling. In other parts of the country serious human rights abuses are carried out by Islamist Shebab militants. Leslie Lefkox said even if it rejects Somalis' asylum applications, the Netherlands should find another legal way of ensuring their safety. And it’s not the first time this kind of situation has arisen, she adds:
“In other places, other situations – I think for example in the Balkans in the past – people have sometimes been given temporary status until the situation improves in the place of origin, so this is not an unusual situation in that sense, there are precedents.”
The Dutch government says it won’t back down on the issue and has promised to release details of a Memorandum of Understanding with the transitional Somali government that forms the legal basis for the deportations, as soon as Mogadishu agrees with to publication.
Too little, too late, says Leslie Lefkow: “A piece of paper signed by the transitional government won’t protect people returned forcibly to Somalia
Tuesday, July 13, 2010
Gwen Ifill talks to an expert on the region.Professor Ahmed samatar
Welcome.
GWEN IFILL: Now, for more on the attacks and the Somali group that claimed responsibility for them, we turn to Ahmed Samatar, dean of the Institute for Global Citizenship at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minnesota. He's written extensively about Somalia, where he was born.
Welcome.
What can you tell us first...
AHMED SAMATAR, dean, Institute for Global Citizenship at Macalester College: Thank you.
GWEN IFILL: Thank you.
What can you tell us, first of all, about Al-Shabab, this -- this murky group?
AHMED SAMATAR: Well, Al-Shabab is a cluster of different groups, primarily young people.
They grew out of the Islamic movement in Somalia, which originally came about as part of a struggle to revive Somali national institutions collapsed in the early 1990s. Al-Shabab then became a very heavy presence, particularly during the Ethiopian invasion of Mogadishu in the southern part of Somalia a few years back, and then from there on began to take a whole new momentum in trying to capture the whole country, although they don't control the whole country. But that's their ambition.
And the project is essentially to impose a very, very strict, rather cruel form of Islamic authoritarianism on the Somali people.
GWEN IFILL: So, when you talk about Al-Shabab, we're not talking about a group with a leader, but we are talking about a group that does have links to al-Qaida?
AHMED SAMATAR: Well, they do have leaders, although they are quite elusive. They have leaders. But it is a cluster of different groups, both in terms of their religious orientation.
At the very technical, you know, moment, they might differ in certain areas, but also they come from different ethnic groups or kin groups among the Somali people. What brings them together is a certain desire for power, to pick up power, what's left of Somali society and national institutions, and then with that power do it through religious mobilization, and a particular kind of a religious mobilization that is heavily grounded in violence and terrorist acts.
GWEN IFILL: But this happened in Uganda. Up until now, Al-Shabab has been focused, as you said, in Somalia. Why Uganda now?
(CROSSTALK)
AHMED SAMATAR: Well, Uganda for a couple of reasons, though the most important one of them is the fact that there are a significant number of Ugandan troops inside Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu and its surroundings.
And they are the leading edge in this organization of African troops from the A.U. -- Burundi also has got a significant number -- that has been sent there essentially to support the transitional federal authority. And the tragedy is that the transitional federal authority under Sharif Ahmed is not only rather illegitimate, but it is frighteningly incompetent.
And, therefore, the Somali people now are caught up in on one side Al-Shabab movement that is extremely cruel and highly puritanical and a transitional federal government that just cannot do anything at all, and sustained therefore by Ugandan and Burundian troops in Mogadishu and the neighborhood in which the transitional federal authority's leadership are now living.
GWEN IFILL: So, if countries like Uganda and Burundi and Ethiopia, if they were to pull their support troops from Somalia, would what's left of the government simply fall apart?
AHMED SAMATAR: Oh, I think so.
The government really has no presence anywhere in the Somali society. In fact, there are regions, particularly in the north, which had rather peaceful elections very recently -- Somaliland, it calls itself -- which is totally in many ways quite different politically in the way they have handled the Somali crisis than the south.
But the Shabab movement's project in Uganda is primarily, A, to send a word and put fright in the hearts of the Africans who are now a part of the troops that are protecting the transitional federal government and make them believe that this is impossible to stay in Somalia, a lesson for the Burundians, too, but then also for the international community that they cannot accept -- that the Shabab is not going to accept any kind of an international force that comes to help the Somali people pick up the pieces. So the project really is about controlling the Somali territory.
GWEN IFILL: How significant is it where these attacks happened, that they happened at World Cup viewing matches, that one happened at an Ethiopian restaurant and the other at a rugby club?
AHMED SAMATAR: Right. Right. Right.
Well, it's significant in the sense that first it gives sense clearly that Al-Shabab can reach out beyond the Somali boundary and the Somali republic. And then, second, it is significant that it can kill and kill with a great deal of ferocity.
And then, thirdly, it can put fear, therefore, both in the sense of the international community that might want to do something about the Somali society, including sending more troops, and, then, secondly, of course, put fear in the Somali people themselves and convince them that there is no alternative to Al-Shabab. That's the underlying, I think, project here.
GWEN IFILL: Professor Ahmed Samatar of Macalester College, thank you so much for helping us out.
Welcome.
What can you tell us first...
AHMED SAMATAR, dean, Institute for Global Citizenship at Macalester College: Thank you.
GWEN IFILL: Thank you.
What can you tell us, first of all, about Al-Shabab, this -- this murky group?
AHMED SAMATAR: Well, Al-Shabab is a cluster of different groups, primarily young people.
They grew out of the Islamic movement in Somalia, which originally came about as part of a struggle to revive Somali national institutions collapsed in the early 1990s. Al-Shabab then became a very heavy presence, particularly during the Ethiopian invasion of Mogadishu in the southern part of Somalia a few years back, and then from there on began to take a whole new momentum in trying to capture the whole country, although they don't control the whole country. But that's their ambition.
And the project is essentially to impose a very, very strict, rather cruel form of Islamic authoritarianism on the Somali people.
GWEN IFILL: So, when you talk about Al-Shabab, we're not talking about a group with a leader, but we are talking about a group that does have links to al-Qaida?
AHMED SAMATAR: Well, they do have leaders, although they are quite elusive. They have leaders. But it is a cluster of different groups, both in terms of their religious orientation.
At the very technical, you know, moment, they might differ in certain areas, but also they come from different ethnic groups or kin groups among the Somali people. What brings them together is a certain desire for power, to pick up power, what's left of Somali society and national institutions, and then with that power do it through religious mobilization, and a particular kind of a religious mobilization that is heavily grounded in violence and terrorist acts.
GWEN IFILL: But this happened in Uganda. Up until now, Al-Shabab has been focused, as you said, in Somalia. Why Uganda now?
(CROSSTALK)
AHMED SAMATAR: Well, Uganda for a couple of reasons, though the most important one of them is the fact that there are a significant number of Ugandan troops inside Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu and its surroundings.
And they are the leading edge in this organization of African troops from the A.U. -- Burundi also has got a significant number -- that has been sent there essentially to support the transitional federal authority. And the tragedy is that the transitional federal authority under Sharif Ahmed is not only rather illegitimate, but it is frighteningly incompetent.
And, therefore, the Somali people now are caught up in on one side Al-Shabab movement that is extremely cruel and highly puritanical and a transitional federal government that just cannot do anything at all, and sustained therefore by Ugandan and Burundian troops in Mogadishu and the neighborhood in which the transitional federal authority's leadership are now living.
GWEN IFILL: So, if countries like Uganda and Burundi and Ethiopia, if they were to pull their support troops from Somalia, would what's left of the government simply fall apart?
AHMED SAMATAR: Oh, I think so.
The government really has no presence anywhere in the Somali society. In fact, there are regions, particularly in the north, which had rather peaceful elections very recently -- Somaliland, it calls itself -- which is totally in many ways quite different politically in the way they have handled the Somali crisis than the south.
But the Shabab movement's project in Uganda is primarily, A, to send a word and put fright in the hearts of the Africans who are now a part of the troops that are protecting the transitional federal government and make them believe that this is impossible to stay in Somalia, a lesson for the Burundians, too, but then also for the international community that they cannot accept -- that the Shabab is not going to accept any kind of an international force that comes to help the Somali people pick up the pieces. So the project really is about controlling the Somali territory.
GWEN IFILL: How significant is it where these attacks happened, that they happened at World Cup viewing matches, that one happened at an Ethiopian restaurant and the other at a rugby club?
AHMED SAMATAR: Right. Right. Right.
Well, it's significant in the sense that first it gives sense clearly that Al-Shabab can reach out beyond the Somali boundary and the Somali republic. And then, second, it is significant that it can kill and kill with a great deal of ferocity.
And then, thirdly, it can put fear, therefore, both in the sense of the international community that might want to do something about the Somali society, including sending more troops, and, then, secondly, of course, put fear in the Somali people themselves and convince them that there is no alternative to Al-Shabab. That's the underlying, I think, project here.
GWEN IFILL: Professor Ahmed Samatar of Macalester College, thank you so much for helping us out.
Sunday, July 11, 2010
Tuesday, July 6, 2010
RAK to sell East African assets(Somaliland)
05/07/2010 - Ras Al Khaimah Property News
Posted by Neil KingRAK Gas, a state utility of Ras Al Khaimah, is looking to raise new funds through the sale of its east African assets, it has been reported.
According to the Independent, RAK Gas is believed to view the assets as non-core sites that do not provide any domestic gas supply.
The newspaper also quoted a gas industry source who suggested the four assets, two of which are based in Tanzania, could fetch "several tens of millions of dollars".
RAK Gas has a 100 per cent stake in the East Pande block in Tanzania and minority interests of between 20 and 25 per cent in the other three assets, which are also located in Somaliland and Egypt.
The company was reported to have sent out a "teaser notice" to potential bidders which provides some basic data on the exploration sites.
Meanwhile, Emirates Business 24/7 last week reported that the Abu Dhabi government is to press ahead with a huge $30 billion investment programme for the development of the emirate's hydrocarbon sector.
Sunday, July 4, 2010
Rare Haven of Stability in Somalia Faces a Test
Rare Haven of Stability in Somalia Faces a Test
By JEFFREY GETTLEMAN
BURAO, Somalia — The rallies usually start early in the morning, before the sunshine hurts.
By 8 a.m. on a recent day, thousands of people were packed into Burao’s sandy town square, with little boys climbing high into the trees to get a peek at the politicians.
“We’re going to end corruption!” one of the politicians boomed, holding several microphones at once. “We’re going to bring dignity back to the people!”
The boys cheered wildly. Wispy militiamen punched bony fists in the air. The politicians’ messages were hardly original. But in this corner of Africa, a free and open political rally — led, no less, by opposition leaders who could actually win — is an anomaly apparently worthy of celebration.
The crowd that day helped tell a strange truth: that one of the most democratic countries in the Horn of Africa is not really a country at all. It is Somaliland, the northwestern corner of Somalia, which, since the disintegration of the Somali state in 1991, has been on a quixotic mission for recognition as its own separate nation.
While so much of Somalia is plagued by relentless violence, this little-known slice of the Somali puzzle is peaceful and organized enough to hold national elections this week, with more than one million registered voters. The campaigns are passionate but fair, say the few Western observers here. The roads are full of battered old Toyotas blasting out slogans from staticky megaphones lashed to the roofs.
Somalilanders have pulled off peaceful national elections three times. The last presidential election in 2003 was decided by a wafer-thin margin, around 80 votes at the time of counting, yet there was no violence. Each successful election feeds the hope here that one day the world will reward Somaliland with recognition for carving a functioning, democratic space out of one of the most chaotic countries in the world.
But this presidential election, scheduled for Saturday, will be one of the biggest tests yet for Somaliland’s budding democracy.
The government seems unpopular, partly because Somaliland is still desperately poor, a place where even in the biggest towns, like Burao or the capital, Hargeisa, countless people dwell in bubble-shaped huts made out of cardboard scraps and flattened oil drums. Most independent observers predict the leading opposition party, Kulmiye, which means something akin to “the one who brings people together,” will get the most votes.
But that does not mean the opposition will necessarily win.
In many cases in Africa — Ethiopia in 2005, Kenya in 2007, Zimbabwe in 2008 — right when the opposition appeared poised to win elections, the government seemed to fiddle with the results, forcibly holding on to power and sometimes provoking widespread unrest in the process.
“There’s probably not going to be many problems with the voting itself, but the day after,” said Roble Mohamed, the former editor in chief of one of Somaliland’s top Web sites. “That is the question.”
Many people here worry that if Somaliland’s governing party, UDUB, tries to hold on to power illegitimately, the well-armed populace (this is still part of Somalia, after all) will rise up and Somaliland’s nearly two decades of peace could disappear in a cloud of gun smoke.
“I know this happens in Africa, but it won’t happen in Somaliland,” promised Said Adani Moge, a spokesman for Somaliland’s government. “If we lose, we’ll give up power. The most important thing is peace.”
Easily said, infrequently done. Peaceful transfers of power are a rarity in this neighborhood. In April, Sudan held its first national elections in more than 20 years (the last change of power was a coup), but the voting was widely considered superficial because of widespread intimidation beforehand and the withdrawal of several leading opposition parties from the presidential race.
Last month’s vote in Ethiopia, in which the governing party and its allies won more than 99 percent of the parliamentary seats, was also tainted by what human rights groups called a campaign of government repression, including the manipulation of American food aid to starve out the opposition.
Then there is little Eritrea, along the Red Sea, which has not held a presidential election since the early 1990s, when it won independence. And Djibouti, home to a large American military base, where the president recently pushed to have the Constitution changed so he could run again.
South-central Somalia, where a very weak transitional government is struggling to fend off radical Islamist insurgents, is so dangerous that residents must risk insurgents’ wrath even to watch the World Cup, never mind holding a vote.
So in this volatile region, Somaliland has become a demonstration of the possible, sustaining a one-person one-vote democracy in a poor, conflict-torn place that gets very little help. While the government in south-central Somalia, which barely controls any territory, receives millions of dollars in direct support from the United Nations and the United States, the Somaliland government “doesn’t get a penny,” Mr. Said said.
Because Somaliland is not recognized as an independent country, it is very difficult for the government here to secure international loans, even though it has become a regional model for conflict resolution and democratic-institution building — buzzwords among Western donors.
In many respects, Somaliland is already its own country, with its own currency, its own army and navy, its own borders and its own national identity, as evidenced by the countless Somaliland T-shirts and flags everywhere you look. Part of this stems from its distinct colonial history, having been ruled, relatively indirectly, by the British, while the rest of Somalia was colonized by the Italians, who set up a European administration.
Italian colonization supplanted local elders, which might have been one reason that much of Somalia plunged into clan-driven chaos after 1991, while Somaliland succeeded in reconciling its clans.
Clan is not the prevailing issue in this election. The three presidential candidates (Somaliland’s election code says only three political parties can compete, and they take turns campaigning from day to day) are from different clans or subclans. Yet, many voters do not seem to care.
In the middle of miles and miles of thorn bush stand two huts about 100 feet apart, one with a green and yellow Kulmiye flag flapping from a stick flagpole, the other with a solid green UDUB flag.
Haboon Roble, a shy 20-year-old, explained that she liked UDUB: “They’re good. They hold up the house.”
But about 100 feet away, her uncle, Abdi Rahman Roble, shook his head. “This government hasn’t done anything for farmers,” he complained. “We can’t even get plastic sheets to catch the rain.”
He said he was voting for Kulmiye. “But I don’t tell anyone how to vote,” Mr. Abdi Rahman said. “That’s their choice.”
And like the other adults in the family, he proudly showed off his new plastic voter card, which he usually keeps hidden in a special place in his hut, along with other valuables.
By JEFFREY GETTLEMAN
BURAO, Somalia — The rallies usually start early in the morning, before the sunshine hurts.
By 8 a.m. on a recent day, thousands of people were packed into Burao’s sandy town square, with little boys climbing high into the trees to get a peek at the politicians.
“We’re going to end corruption!” one of the politicians boomed, holding several microphones at once. “We’re going to bring dignity back to the people!”
The boys cheered wildly. Wispy militiamen punched bony fists in the air. The politicians’ messages were hardly original. But in this corner of Africa, a free and open political rally — led, no less, by opposition leaders who could actually win — is an anomaly apparently worthy of celebration.
The crowd that day helped tell a strange truth: that one of the most democratic countries in the Horn of Africa is not really a country at all. It is Somaliland, the northwestern corner of Somalia, which, since the disintegration of the Somali state in 1991, has been on a quixotic mission for recognition as its own separate nation.
While so much of Somalia is plagued by relentless violence, this little-known slice of the Somali puzzle is peaceful and organized enough to hold national elections this week, with more than one million registered voters. The campaigns are passionate but fair, say the few Western observers here. The roads are full of battered old Toyotas blasting out slogans from staticky megaphones lashed to the roofs.
Somalilanders have pulled off peaceful national elections three times. The last presidential election in 2003 was decided by a wafer-thin margin, around 80 votes at the time of counting, yet there was no violence. Each successful election feeds the hope here that one day the world will reward Somaliland with recognition for carving a functioning, democratic space out of one of the most chaotic countries in the world.
But this presidential election, scheduled for Saturday, will be one of the biggest tests yet for Somaliland’s budding democracy.
The government seems unpopular, partly because Somaliland is still desperately poor, a place where even in the biggest towns, like Burao or the capital, Hargeisa, countless people dwell in bubble-shaped huts made out of cardboard scraps and flattened oil drums. Most independent observers predict the leading opposition party, Kulmiye, which means something akin to “the one who brings people together,” will get the most votes.
But that does not mean the opposition will necessarily win.
In many cases in Africa — Ethiopia in 2005, Kenya in 2007, Zimbabwe in 2008 — right when the opposition appeared poised to win elections, the government seemed to fiddle with the results, forcibly holding on to power and sometimes provoking widespread unrest in the process.
“There’s probably not going to be many problems with the voting itself, but the day after,” said Roble Mohamed, the former editor in chief of one of Somaliland’s top Web sites. “That is the question.”
Many people here worry that if Somaliland’s governing party, UDUB, tries to hold on to power illegitimately, the well-armed populace (this is still part of Somalia, after all) will rise up and Somaliland’s nearly two decades of peace could disappear in a cloud of gun smoke.
“I know this happens in Africa, but it won’t happen in Somaliland,” promised Said Adani Moge, a spokesman for Somaliland’s government. “If we lose, we’ll give up power. The most important thing is peace.”
Easily said, infrequently done. Peaceful transfers of power are a rarity in this neighborhood. In April, Sudan held its first national elections in more than 20 years (the last change of power was a coup), but the voting was widely considered superficial because of widespread intimidation beforehand and the withdrawal of several leading opposition parties from the presidential race.
Last month’s vote in Ethiopia, in which the governing party and its allies won more than 99 percent of the parliamentary seats, was also tainted by what human rights groups called a campaign of government repression, including the manipulation of American food aid to starve out the opposition.
Then there is little Eritrea, along the Red Sea, which has not held a presidential election since the early 1990s, when it won independence. And Djibouti, home to a large American military base, where the president recently pushed to have the Constitution changed so he could run again.
South-central Somalia, where a very weak transitional government is struggling to fend off radical Islamist insurgents, is so dangerous that residents must risk insurgents’ wrath even to watch the World Cup, never mind holding a vote.
So in this volatile region, Somaliland has become a demonstration of the possible, sustaining a one-person one-vote democracy in a poor, conflict-torn place that gets very little help. While the government in south-central Somalia, which barely controls any territory, receives millions of dollars in direct support from the United Nations and the United States, the Somaliland government “doesn’t get a penny,” Mr. Said said.
Because Somaliland is not recognized as an independent country, it is very difficult for the government here to secure international loans, even though it has become a regional model for conflict resolution and democratic-institution building — buzzwords among Western donors.
In many respects, Somaliland is already its own country, with its own currency, its own army and navy, its own borders and its own national identity, as evidenced by the countless Somaliland T-shirts and flags everywhere you look. Part of this stems from its distinct colonial history, having been ruled, relatively indirectly, by the British, while the rest of Somalia was colonized by the Italians, who set up a European administration.
Italian colonization supplanted local elders, which might have been one reason that much of Somalia plunged into clan-driven chaos after 1991, while Somaliland succeeded in reconciling its clans.
Clan is not the prevailing issue in this election. The three presidential candidates (Somaliland’s election code says only three political parties can compete, and they take turns campaigning from day to day) are from different clans or subclans. Yet, many voters do not seem to care.
In the middle of miles and miles of thorn bush stand two huts about 100 feet apart, one with a green and yellow Kulmiye flag flapping from a stick flagpole, the other with a solid green UDUB flag.
Haboon Roble, a shy 20-year-old, explained that she liked UDUB: “They’re good. They hold up the house.”
But about 100 feet away, her uncle, Abdi Rahman Roble, shook his head. “This government hasn’t done anything for farmers,” he complained. “We can’t even get plastic sheets to catch the rain.”
He said he was voting for Kulmiye. “But I don’t tell anyone how to vote,” Mr. Abdi Rahman said. “That’s their choice.”
And like the other adults in the family, he proudly showed off his new plastic voter card, which he usually keeps hidden in a special place in his hut, along with other valuables.
Friday, July 2, 2010
Somaliland’s opposition leader Ahmed Mahmoud Silanyo won
By William Davison
July 2 (Bloomberg) -- Somaliland’s opposition leader Ahmed Mahmoud Silanyo won the June 26 presidential election in the breakaway region of Somalia, in a vote that observers said met international standards.
Silanyo took 49.6 percent of the vote, ahead of President Dahir Riyale Kahin with 33.2 percent and Faisal Ali Warabe of the Justice and Welfare Party with 17.2 percent, the National Electoral Commission said yesterday in Hargeisa, the capital. Turnout was about 55 percent of the estimated 1 million registered voters, according to the commission.
Silanyo, speaking today by phone, said his Kulmiye party would introduce a “leaner and more efficient government” that would be “prepared to work fully with the international community on issues of anti-terrorism and piracy.”
Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991, after the fall of former dictator Mohammed Siad Barre. No sovereign state has recognized the region as an independent nation. The election was delayed for two years because of wrangling over voter registration.
The losing parties have 10 days to make formal complaints about the preliminary results to the Supreme Court. Mahdi Gulaid, a legal adviser to the commission, said he expected a challenge from President Riyale’s party.
“I think they have grievances and complaints,” he said today by phone from Hargeisa. “I think they will complain.”
Riyale became president of the former British colony in 2002 and won election to the post in 2003, after his party defeated Kulmiye by 80 votes. His term expires on July 26.
‘Democratic Adherence’
Three U.K.-based groups that monitored the vote said the election was peaceful and praised the candidates “for their adherence to the democratic process.”
“Despite the many delays in the run-up to the election, the mission would like to point out that the days prior to the polling day -- and polling day itself -- were notable for their spirit of peacefulness and goodwill,” Progressio, a London-based development agency that was part of an observer mission of three groups, said yesterday in a statement.
Silanyo said he hoped the election would prompt the international community to “give more attention to Somaliland’s recognition and development.”
--Editors: Karl Maier, Phil Sanders
To contact the reporter on this story: William Davison in Hargeisa via Johannesburg at pmrichardson@bloomberg.net.
To contact the editor responsible for this story: Antony Sguazzin in Johannesburg at asguazzin@bloomberg.net.
July 2 (Bloomberg) -- Somaliland’s opposition leader Ahmed Mahmoud Silanyo won the June 26 presidential election in the breakaway region of Somalia, in a vote that observers said met international standards.
Silanyo took 49.6 percent of the vote, ahead of President Dahir Riyale Kahin with 33.2 percent and Faisal Ali Warabe of the Justice and Welfare Party with 17.2 percent, the National Electoral Commission said yesterday in Hargeisa, the capital. Turnout was about 55 percent of the estimated 1 million registered voters, according to the commission.
Silanyo, speaking today by phone, said his Kulmiye party would introduce a “leaner and more efficient government” that would be “prepared to work fully with the international community on issues of anti-terrorism and piracy.”
Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991, after the fall of former dictator Mohammed Siad Barre. No sovereign state has recognized the region as an independent nation. The election was delayed for two years because of wrangling over voter registration.
The losing parties have 10 days to make formal complaints about the preliminary results to the Supreme Court. Mahdi Gulaid, a legal adviser to the commission, said he expected a challenge from President Riyale’s party.
“I think they have grievances and complaints,” he said today by phone from Hargeisa. “I think they will complain.”
Riyale became president of the former British colony in 2002 and won election to the post in 2003, after his party defeated Kulmiye by 80 votes. His term expires on July 26.
‘Democratic Adherence’
Three U.K.-based groups that monitored the vote said the election was peaceful and praised the candidates “for their adherence to the democratic process.”
“Despite the many delays in the run-up to the election, the mission would like to point out that the days prior to the polling day -- and polling day itself -- were notable for their spirit of peacefulness and goodwill,” Progressio, a London-based development agency that was part of an observer mission of three groups, said yesterday in a statement.
Silanyo said he hoped the election would prompt the international community to “give more attention to Somaliland’s recognition and development.”
--Editors: Karl Maier, Phil Sanders
To contact the reporter on this story: William Davison in Hargeisa via Johannesburg at pmrichardson@bloomberg.net.
To contact the editor responsible for this story: Antony Sguazzin in Johannesburg at asguazzin@bloomberg.net.
Thursday, July 1, 2010
Prostate-Cancer Screening Reduces Deaths by 50%
By Kristen Hallam - Jun 30, 2010
A blood test for prostate cancer helped reduce deaths from the disease by almost 50 percent after 14 years in a study, though overall mortality barely changed as patients died of other causes.
Of 10,000 men invited for the screening every two years, 44 died of prostate cancer, compared with 78 of 10,000 men who weren’t offered the test, according to researchers at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden. Total deaths were almost identical, at 1,981 in the screening group compared with 1,982.
The researchers said 293 men need to be screened and 12 diagnosed with prostate cancer to save one from dying of the disease. The finding may influence doctors’ debate over whether there’s too much screening and treatment of prostate cancer.
“Most of us feel better overtreating than undertreating,” Elizabeth Kavaler, an urologist at Lenox Hill Hospital in New York, who wasn’t involved in the research, said in an e-mail. “This study supports that approach.”
The prostate-cancer tests reduced deaths from the disease more than comparable screening has done for breast cancer and colorectal cancer, according to the study. The results from the research, which is continuing, were published online today in Lancet Oncology.
In the study, 11.4 percent of men in the screening group and 7.2 percent in the control group were diagnosed with prostate cancer.
Most of the benefits of prostate-cancer screening occur after 10 years, the researchers said.
“This is to be expected from a disease with long lead-time and a long natural course,” the authors wrote. The men studied had a median age of 56 when they entered the research.
Men Over 70
“As the risk of over-diagnosis and over-treatment are still the major concerns in prostate-cancer screening, inviting men over age 70 for PSA screening seems questionable,” the researchers wrote.
The findings don’t imply that PSA screening programs should be introduced globally, wrote David Neal, a professor of surgical oncology at the University of Cambridge in England, in an commentary accompanying the study report.
Prostate-cancer screening has been controversial because the tests can detect cancers that don’t threaten the patients’ health, resulting in unnecessary treatment that can impair quality of life, Neal wrote.
“Current programs that raise awareness and provide balanced information about the pros and cons of screening seem to be the right way forward,” he wrote.
The test detects the presence of a protein made by the prostate gland called prostate-specific antigen, or PSA. Higher concentrations of PSA in the blood point to a greater risk of prostate cancer.
The Swedish Cancer Society, the Swedish Research Council and the U.S. National Cancer Institute funded the study.
To contact the reporter on this story: Kristen Hallam in London at khallam@bloomberg.net
A blood test for prostate cancer helped reduce deaths from the disease by almost 50 percent after 14 years in a study, though overall mortality barely changed as patients died of other causes.
Of 10,000 men invited for the screening every two years, 44 died of prostate cancer, compared with 78 of 10,000 men who weren’t offered the test, according to researchers at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden. Total deaths were almost identical, at 1,981 in the screening group compared with 1,982.
The researchers said 293 men need to be screened and 12 diagnosed with prostate cancer to save one from dying of the disease. The finding may influence doctors’ debate over whether there’s too much screening and treatment of prostate cancer.
“Most of us feel better overtreating than undertreating,” Elizabeth Kavaler, an urologist at Lenox Hill Hospital in New York, who wasn’t involved in the research, said in an e-mail. “This study supports that approach.”
The prostate-cancer tests reduced deaths from the disease more than comparable screening has done for breast cancer and colorectal cancer, according to the study. The results from the research, which is continuing, were published online today in Lancet Oncology.
In the study, 11.4 percent of men in the screening group and 7.2 percent in the control group were diagnosed with prostate cancer.
Most of the benefits of prostate-cancer screening occur after 10 years, the researchers said.
“This is to be expected from a disease with long lead-time and a long natural course,” the authors wrote. The men studied had a median age of 56 when they entered the research.
Men Over 70
“As the risk of over-diagnosis and over-treatment are still the major concerns in prostate-cancer screening, inviting men over age 70 for PSA screening seems questionable,” the researchers wrote.
The findings don’t imply that PSA screening programs should be introduced globally, wrote David Neal, a professor of surgical oncology at the University of Cambridge in England, in an commentary accompanying the study report.
Prostate-cancer screening has been controversial because the tests can detect cancers that don’t threaten the patients’ health, resulting in unnecessary treatment that can impair quality of life, Neal wrote.
“Current programs that raise awareness and provide balanced information about the pros and cons of screening seem to be the right way forward,” he wrote.
The test detects the presence of a protein made by the prostate gland called prostate-specific antigen, or PSA. Higher concentrations of PSA in the blood point to a greater risk of prostate cancer.
The Swedish Cancer Society, the Swedish Research Council and the U.S. National Cancer Institute funded the study.
To contact the reporter on this story: Kristen Hallam in London at khallam@bloomberg.net
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Adal Flag
